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Introduction to Pragmatism and
Psychologism 
Rosa M. Calcaterra and Roberta Dreon
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Although this introduction has been a joint effort, Rosa Calcaterra wrote §1 while Roberta
Dreon wrote §2.
 
§1
1 According to the paradigmatic formula offered by Kant,1 the philosopher’s task consists of
demonstrating “how we ought to think” as opposed to “how we do think” – that is, logical
rules or norms must be separated from the functioning principles of the human mind or
from psychological laws. As it is well-known, in the “Preface” to the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason, the German philosopher stands against “some moderns” who “have
thought  to  enlarge”  logic  “interpolating  psychological  chapters  about  our  different
cognitive powers (about imagination, wit) or metaphysical chapters about the origins of
cognition or the different kinds of certainty in accordance with the diversity of objects
(about idealism, skepticism, etc), or anthropological chapters about our prejudice (about
their causes or remedies).” In his view, this does not involve an “improvement” but a
“deformation” of logic, so such observations must be set aside when one seeks to deal
with the principles of the correct or rational way of thinking, knowing and acting. Kant
explains that psychological, metaphysical, anthropological clarifications go beyond the
boundaries of logic, which are “determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is the
science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all
thinking (whether this thinking be empirical or a priori, whatever origin or object it may
have, and whatever contingent or natural obstacles it may meet with in our minds).”2
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Thus, for Kant as well as for all those who have accepted his ‘normative’ approach to
logic, the “how we do think” falls out the realm of logic as pivotal subject of philosophy,
whose task is indeed to grasp and define the very features and conditions of human
thought. Authors such as Frege and Husserl apparently adopted such a stance that they
contrasted to the so-called “psychologist” account of knowing and thinking processes.
2 However, there is great difficulty in establishing clearly what the term “psychologism”
means and the authors who are usually listed under this label or are placed in the ranks
of  anti-psychologists  often  present  aspects  that  are  contrary  to  the  ordinary
classifications and even clash with their own statements of intellectual heredity. Indeed,
what is called into play is the primary task that the prevailing Western philosophical
tradition has assigned itself since its origins, namely the prerogative of winning access to
universal knowledge and values, in turn conceived as the very apotheosis of rationality in
abstraction  from  the  affective-sensorial  sphere  of  the  human  being.  In  addition,
classifications largely depend on the interpretations of the philosophical texts that are
taken into  account,  that  is,  on  the  reading  and understanding  of  their  most  salient
aspects,  as well  as on the theoretical  perspectives that each interpretation inevitably
brings with itself.  In this light one can, for instance, read a paradigmatic case of the
intricate debate on psychology: Hegel’s criticism of Kant, the philosopher who provided
the classic  formulation of  the difference between psychologists  and normativists  but
whom Hegel without hesitation branded a psychologist.
3 Venturing  a  very  condensed  summary,  let  us  remember  that  Hegel’s  controversial
argument concerns the Kantian deduction of the categories and its major aspects, that is,
the distinction between intuition and concept, or between the empirical multiplicity and
the synthetic unity of the transcendental apperception, as well as the role of imagination
in the formulation of judgments. Above all, Hegel reproaches Kant for concentrating on
the analysis of the cognitive faculties without being able to overcome subjectivism, that is
to  say  without  being able  to  account  for  the  subject  and object  “zweyseitige”  –  the
identity in the difference – which originally links the intellect  and the world of  the
phenomena of nature.3 In short, the accusation of psychologism is identified with the
accusation of subjectivism that Hegel addresses to Kant, stigmatizing in particular the
causal relationship that the latter would establish between intellect and imagination, so
that the unity of the Kantian ego would be inevitably compromised by the importance
attributed  to  the  realm  of  subjectivity.  Alternatively,  Hegel’s  intent  is  to  prove  the
original unity of subjectivity and objectivity, activity and passivity, which, in his opinion,
appears in consciousness; therefore he commits himself to offering an account of the
categorical apparatus capable of capturing its common belonging to thought and being.
4 This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  the  correctness  of  the  arguments  used  by  Hegel  to
recommend the overcoming of the “psychologism” that he attributes to Kantian logic.
The fact remains that this polemical stance extends throughout the entire spectrum of
Hegel’s  speculation;  in  fact  he  defines  Kantian  transcendentalism  as  “psychological
idealism” also in Wissenshaft der Logik.4 In any event, the identification of psychology and
subjectivism on which the Hegelian criticism of Kant revolves is still one of the leitmotifs
of the debate on the topic of the present Symposium. 
5 We  must  also  remember  that  the  term  “subjectivism”  has  different  philosophical
meanings – the Humean, the Cartesian-Kantian, the Husserlian, or the Fregean – each of
which  inevitably  bears  on  the  understanding  of  psychologism  and  its  normative
counterpoint. Indeed, the word ‘subjectivism’ may hold a logical-semantic value which is
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close to all that can be attributed to the realm of the particular and the contingent, of the
merely individual or even idiosyncratic; or rather a value that implies the recognition of a
universal  sharing  of  certain  aspects  of  the  human  mind.  Notwithstanding  the
inexhaustible commitment of both philosophy and psychology to defining these universal
traits, the question of psychologism is often compromised by a confusion between the
idea that there are ‘mental states’ and the idea that there is or should be a “study of
mental states.” From this point of view, one can argue, for example, for the interpretation
of Frege as paradigmatic with regard to the proximity of anti-psychologism with so-called
logical platonism, a closness which is indeed questionable.
6 The close kinship between logical-semantic Platonism and a logical theory of an anti-
psychological moldis signaled by several interpreters of Fregean viewpoint; for example,
Susan  Haack  identifies  this  mold  is  conjunction  as  the  source  of  Frege’s  anti-
psychologism,  insisting  on  his  affirmation  that  logic  has  nothing  to  do  with  mental
processes. Above all, she rejects the Fregean position, arguing that the Platonic structure
of anti-psychologism implies a lack of recognition of the ‘public’ nature of logical rules;
she favors a “moderate psychologism” that attributes to logic a prescriptive function for
mental processes especially insofar as they are linguistic processes – that is, that asserts
that logical laws establish relationships between propositions or sentences. Within this
last definition, Haack includes Pierce and James, although differently, and it is interesting
to note that she formulates in their wake a logical-epistemological theory which aims to
safeguard both the causal role of sensory experience and the evaluation component of
mental processes.5
7 There could be many other examples of the variety of ways of codifying psychology and
its allies as well as its opponents. As a matter of fact, the philosophy of the past century
contains a dramatic oscillation between a strong condemnation of psychologism across-
the-board – targeting phenomenology as well as certain important areas within analytic
philosophy – and a more recent trend in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive
sciences to naturalize philosophical inquiries in a way that welcomes the translations of
existing  philosophical  vocabularies  into  psychological  ones.  Additionally,  for  several
decades  there  has  been a  widespread effort  to  re-elaborate  a  particularly  dense and
intricate  group  of  theoretical-methodological  conceptual  pairs  that  nourish  the
oppositional  mentality  framing  the  traditional  distinction  between  philosophy  and
psychology and, subsequently, the same opposition of Psychologism and anti-psychology
or normativism. I refer mainly to concepts such as “physical” and “psychic,” “subjective”
and “objective,” “external” and “internal,” “relational” and “absolute,” “dynamic” and
“structural,”  “individual”  and  “social,”  “universal”  and  “historical-cultural,”  and
ultimately “descriptive” and “normative.”
8 As a first approximation, it can be said that attention to the dimension of language and at
the same time the enhancement of the category of sociality have formed the cornerstones
of  a  broad revision of  these  key  notions  of  the  Western philosophical  vocabulary,  a
revision  that  in  essence  has  promoted  the treatment  of  these  conceptual  pairs  in  a
functional rather than dichotomous sense. In a nutshell, what has come to be questioned
is the traditional foundationalist stance that underlies the oppositional mentality, that is,
the search for an ab-solutum primum, whether logical or ontological, on which to support
the validity of our epistemology and values. In this regard, very important contributions
from the Wittgensteinian perspective have been offered, especially where the Austrian
philosopher  shows  the  extreme  difficulty  of  drawing  sharp  boundaries  between  one
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concept  and another,  but  also from emblematic  areas of  post-neopositivist  analytical
philosophy – from Willard Quine to Wilfrid Sellars and Donald Davidson – as well as from
prominent representatives of post Husserlian phenomenology – such as Adolf Reinach,
Alfred Schütz and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  But no less interesting is the contribution
offered by the Pragmatist elaborations of the concept of experience, through which the
dichotomous mentality that governs Western philosophical tradition and, specifically, its
typical fundamentalist stance, are variously challenged. 
9 From an overall point of view, it can be said that, differently from the modern empiricism
of Locke and Hume, the Pragmatist notion of experience consists of the elaboration of a
form of epistemological holism that excludes the absolute priority of sensory data over
concepts or their fundamental role in the formation of beliefs and, therefore, also any
ultimate or self-sufficient criterion defining their own validity. In other words, according
to classical Pragmatists, an inter-relational and dynamic view of the cognitive processes
must be adopted, for which the isolationist theory of sensations deriving from Hume, on
which  the  foundationalist  ambition  of  tradition  empiricist  revolves,  is  regarded  as
untenable.  Pragmatists  seek  instead  to  highlight  the  irreducible  intersection  of  the
sensory/affective field with the intellectual;  more precisely,  they suggest the virtuous
circularity between the  concrete  field  of  action,  the  logical-semantic  sphere,  and the
cognitive  sphere.  From  this  follows  a  Pragmatic  understanding  of  the  notion  of
“foundation,” which tends to combine the epistemic and ethical criteria of truth and
objectivity  with  the  domain  of  action,  as  a  socially  tangible  demonstration  of  the
functional polyvalence of the concept of experience – its functioning as instrument for
the formation of beliefs, as well as its work as a concrete source of their correction or
denial. 
10 It should be emphasized that the pragmatic notion of “foundation” does not correspond
to  a  pure  and  simple  reversal  of  the  terms  of  the  rationalist/idealistic  relationship
between the conceptual domain and the empirical domain or, more generally, between
theory and practice. Rather, it is employed to give a more meaningful sense to the usual
statement that ideas or theories have impact on practice, acknowledging the latter as a
basic  component  not  only  of  knowledge  building  but  also  of  the  awareness  of  their
fallibility  in  principle.  This  is  a  typical  attitude  of  both  classic  and  contemporary
pragmatist  thinking,  but  it  remains  the  fact  that  according  to  the  enemies  of
psychologism, James, Dewey, and Mead – though not Peirce – where responsible for a
“psychologist  fallacy”  consisting  in  conflating  objective  causes  or  necessary  rules  of
logical  processes  with  subjective  reasons;  as  a  consequence,  pragmatist  conceptions
sharing Dewey’s  understanding of  logic  as  the  natural  history of  thought  have been
criticized for missing the very point of logic altogether. Yet for the pragmatists the very
dualism of logic and psychology was a problematic theoretical constructions that needed
to be submitted to critical inquiry. Indeed, the very gist of pragmatist arguments such as
the reject of the fact/value dichotomy in the name of the intertwinement of logic with
the affective, biological and cultural sphere could be read as attempt at rethinking the
relationships between logic and psychology. And pragmatist “cultural naturalism” can be
seen as similarly attempting to overcome the psychologism/anti-psychologism divide. 
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§2
11 The current issue of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy explores
the ways in which the founders of Pragmatism, Peirce and James, can be situated in the
Psychologism/anti-Psychologism  debate.  The  many  forms  of  anti-Psychologism  are
placed  under  investigation  by  the  authors  of  this  volume,  definitively  suggesting  a
multifaceted  picture  of  Psychologism.  If  the  whole  issue  could  be  simplified  in  the
question whether  or  not  the  Pragmatists  were  Psychologist  or  anti-Psychologist,  the
general result of the current inquiry is that the problem cannot be solved by means of a
mere  ascription  or  non-attribution  of  these  labels  to  them.  Although  reasonable
arguments can be found for sustaining the thesis that both Peirce and James were anti-
Psychologist – in very different ways and with very different styles – the crucial point
emerges that they shared a general critical stance towards formulating the question in
terms of facile dichotomies. 
12 A series of papers – Tiercelin’s, Sanfelix’s and Lanfredini’s – help us examine this complex
variety of implications. Claudine Tiercelin explicitly faces both the main charges basically
characterizing a standard critical stance towards a Psychologist attitude in logic: that on
the one hand, Psychologism in logic would involve a general collapsing of the normative
domain of logical rules into the empirical ways we de facto think and reason; and that on
the  other hand,  a  psychological  reading  of  logic  would  imply  its  reduction  to  mere
subjective conditions of thought. The second feature is clearly shared by Peirce’s strong
criticism  of  introspection  considered  as  a  kind  of  immediate  approach  to  certain
knowledge,  namely  as  a  privileged  grasp  that  avoids  the  allegedly  ubiquitous  doubt
concerning  our  experience  of  the  external  world  according  to  a  Cartesian  stance.
Tiercelin’s  paper  stresses  Peirce’s  clear  preference  for  an  externalist  treatment  of
typically psychological features such as sensations, emotions and beliefs – a point that
will be further developed in positive and promising ways by Giovanni Maddalena’s essay
and by Matteo Santarelli’s article. 
13 Dealing with the normative-empirical divide is a more complex issue in Peirce’s theory of
the sign and Tiercelin tackles the problem in its complexity. First of all she points out the
general  Pragmatist  dislike  of  the  standard  dualism  between  “how  we  would  think”
according to logical rules and “how we actually think” in actual conditions of human life.
Secondly she stresses that the role of logic in semiotics cannot be reduced to formal logic
and to mathematical calculus, because logic has not simply to apply rules of reasoning;
logic  must  also  consider  what  reasoning is,  its  different  forms and how it  should be
developed.  Thirdly  Tiercelin  sustains  the  thesis  that  Peirce  elaborated  an  original
conception of normativity and of the relation between norms and nature, allowing him to
consider logical laws as emerging from nature: her central argument is that, although
radical indeterminacy is the dominant character of evolution, the growth of concrete
reasonableness produces a logical field where we have to understand truth as a normative
property. As she writes: “[l]ogical norms are inferential norms, governing what we can
expect an agent to believe, if he has certain beliefs.” In this interpretation Peirce seems to
occupy a third, intermediate position between the standard logical anti-Psychologism à la
Frege and Psychologism as reductive naturalism.
14 Vicente Sanfelix Vidarte focuses our attention precisely on this issue in relation to James:
can James’ position on epistemology be characterized as involving a form of reductive
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naturalization à  la Quine?  His  paper  provides  an  answer  by  means  of  an innovative
confrontation  between  James’  conception  of  psychology  as  a  science,  his  theory  of
knowledge, and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. His basic assumption is that
Wittgenstein cannot be confined as a merely critical reader of James and that it can be
philosophically  fruitful  identifying some aspects  of  both James’  Variety and Principles
which were or could be shared by Wittgenstein himself. Sanfelix claims that James was
not simply reducing epistemology to psychology, because he was strongly conscious of
the controversial  status of  many psychological  concepts as well  as of  the inability of
psychology  to  pose  the question  about  the  possibility  of  knowledge  in  general.
Nevertheless,  in Sanfelix’s interpretation,  James’  approach to epistemology could also
teach something to the early Wittgenstein: theory of knowledge cannot be simply and
completely translated into a logic disentangling psychological propositions, because such
a move leaves some crucial metaphysical issues outside the door. This is why James was
brave enough to try finding a substantive answer, represented by his genetic naturalism.
Logical apriori structures have to be explained as the result of natural selection: although
being the ultimate outcome of a merely contingent development, they were transmitted
and became part of the innate endowment of the human mind, surprisingly opening the
door for a normative space born out of chance. Even Sanfelix’ interpretation of James’
position  –  although  with  a  different  style  –  tends  to  strengthen  the  idea  of  the
Pragmatists as suggesting a third way between Psychologism and anti-Psychologism; here
logic  and epistemology seem to be anchored in human developmental  anthropology,
although they represent the emergence of a new field of normative relationships that
cannot be reduced to previous forms of living interactions with the environment. 
15 By  suggesting  a  comparison  between  Husserl’s  and  James’  positions  on  experience,
Roberta Lanfredini understands James’ anti-Psychologism as a form of neutralization. In
her  reading  of  James,  neutralizing  a  psychologistic  approach  to  experience  means
basically denying any form of  privilege to consciousness as well  as any priority to a
cognitive position on experience. Therefore the net outcome of James’ Essays on Radical
Empiricism is a conception of pure experience as impersonal and equidistant from both
objectivity and subjectivity. Experiential features can be distinguished on a functional
level but are not to be assumed as ontologically different: different kinds of order are
legitimate  and both  Husserl’s  basic  asymmetry  in  favour  of  the  noetic  pole  and  his
eminently cognitive conception of experience have to be rejected in pursuing a radical
thought about experience. Nonetheless Lanfredini argues that both Husserl’s and James’
neutralization are not radical enough because they would share a preeminence of the
present in reference to the other temporal dimensions as well as an idea of experience as
made of discrete parts that should be overcome.
16 Claudia Cristalli’s and Alexander Feodorov’s papers shed some light on two particular
aspects  of  Peirce’s  philosophy,  playing an important  role  in  configuring his  peculiar
position in the Psychologism – anti-Psychologism debate. Cristalli basically endorses an
interpretation of Peirce as a clear-cut anti-Psychologist in logic from his very beginnings,
and so has to tackle the problem of Peirce’s strong interest in doubt and belief in the
period between 1868 and 1885 – namely with widely psychological concepts troubling his
whole philosophical oeuvre. In order to understand better those years, Cristalli inquiries
into Peirce’s strong interest in experimental psychology and its role in his philosophy.
She strongly stresses the experimental-psychological preference for a quantitative and
inferential approach to psychic phenomena as a key element in overcoming the standard
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introspective  and  qualitative  oriented  approach  to  psychology.  This  conversion  of
psychology into a properly scientific discipline should have represented for Peirce the
chance to consider also the practical dimension of logic, which would consist in testing
scientific inferences by considering their material consequences. 
17 Feodorov  pays  special  attention  to  the  concept  of  habit  in  Peirce’s  thought  as  an
important  element  in  understanding  his  non-Psychologistic  stance.  Feodorov
reconstructs the origin of the Pragmatists’ strong interest in habit in Alexander Bain’s
theory of belief,  which was very influential  on the first Pragmatists.  Bain shifted the
concept of belief out of an eminently cognitive interpretation – according to which a
belief should basically be a meaning deposited in the mind or a mental state – into a
practical frame: a belief is primarily a disposition to act. Peirce’s emphasis on beliefs as
habits of action clearly developed Bain’s idea, although he criticised the psychological
interpretation  of  the  concept,  according  to  Feodorov.  In  his  reading  of  Peirce,  the
Pragmatist’s idea of habit was preserved from becoming a merely psychological concept
because Peirce extended it out of the human environment into the physical world, by
adopting a conception of habit concerning the evolution of the whole universe. In this
perspective cosmology appears to be a true antidote to Psychologism.
18 To conclude this synthetic survey, both Maddalena’s and Santarelli’s papers seem to go
beyond a defense of the Pragmatists’  position with regard to the whole issue we are
discussing. On the contrary, they venture into a more open exchange between philosophy
and psychology, inspired by Peirce’s semiotic philosophy. Maddalena tends to scale down
the early Peirce’s  anti-psychologist  attitude in logic by characterizing it  as a general
criticism to an inappropriate mixture of disciplines inquiring into the process of reason.
This concern did not prevent Peirce from denying the importance of widely psychological
features in human reasoning, such as feelings, sensations, beliefs, habits and doubts that
could be reinterpreted in externalist terms. Moreover Maddalena argues that during the
years when Peirce developed a synthetic approach by means of the so-called existential
graphs,  he  was  more  open  to  including  psychological  elements  in  his  philosophical
approach in order to avoid the problematic distinction between the phenomenological
level of analysis and the psychological, adopted in the previous period. 
19 This  is  the  premise  for  a  challenging comparison between Peirce  and Jung on their
respective conceptions of the conscious self as emerging out of a collective unconscious.
In Peirce’s case the ego loses its allegedly omnipotent power as the subject of meaning; on
the contrary, it seems to grow out of the collective semiotic processes, which largely
precede the intervention of individual egos. In turn, individual egos appear as the sources
of transformation of larger collective symbolic processes, rather than as the very points
of departure of knowledge. In both authors Maddalena sees “selfhood as a result to be
attained within a  broader flux of  experience,”  whose symbolic,  although impersonal,
characterization appears crucial in the synthetic processes giving rise to individualized
selves.
20 Matteo Santarelli sustains the thesis that Peirce’s externalist re-interpretation of many
crucial psychological concepts could leave more room for developing a psychology of
inner states focused on the communicative and semiotic processes in which they emerge
and are configured. In other terms, Peirce’s criticism of introspection as an allegedly
immediate grasp of psychological phenomena could represent a chance for a different
approach to them – a kind of third, non-dualistic approach avoiding both internalism and
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behavioristic  eliminativism,  focusing  on  the  collective  semiotic  processes  in  which
psychological phenomena would be shaped. 
21 Rethinking  Peirce’s  philosophy  is  considered  as  an  opportunity  for  re-stablishing
psychological categories on a non-Psychologist ground – namely a ground which is not
the idea of  introspection as  an immediate grasp of  intra-psychic phenomena.  A first
attempt in developing this ambitious project is represented by Santarelli’s inquiry into
the psychology of attachment, where both social relations and their significance clearly
appear as the ground out of which individual feelings,  beliefs and dispositions to act
emerge and are configured.
22 Once  more  this  topic  is  a  case  where  classical  Pragmatism  reveals  a  complexity  of
approach  frustrating  the  desire  for  clear-cut  simple  and  binary  solutions;  dualistic
stances show their inappropriateness, and alternative, not already guaranteed ways of
investigation have to be attempted.
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